The fallout from the 2017 Catalan independence referendum rumbles on.
Ten years ago, not many commentators thought that a
unilateral declaration of independence would come from the prosperous
Spanish region of Catalonia. Similarly, a scenario in which prominent
and mostly elected Catalan pro-independence leaders have either fled
Spanish courts or been imprisoned was not considered plausible or
likely. Today, however, these two events have become a reality, as well
as the use of Article 155 of the Spanish Constitution to impose direct
rule on Catalonia between 28 October 2017 and 2 June 2018 as a response
to a unilateral declaration of independence by the Catalan government on
27 October 2017, a move that was deemed illegal by Spain’s
Constitutional Court.
One of the direct
consequencesof these events is the
increase in polarisation within
Catalan society between those who support independence (47.5% of voters
in the last regional election held on December 2017) and those who want
to remain a part of Spain. In this environment, leaders on both sides
who take a more conciliatory approach are labelled as “traitors” by
hard-liners who are unwilling to compromise. For instance, Carles
Puigdemont, the former president of the Catalan government, was
considered a traitor for a few hours by certain secessionist factions
when the media speculated that he was planning to defuse the situation
by announcing elections in return for Spain’s government not applying
article 155 in Catalonia. The same occurred with Santi Vila, former
regional minister of Enterprise and Knowledge in Catalonia, after he
distanced himself from the position of the Catalan government regarding
the unilateral declaration of independence before announcing his
resignation.
On the other hand, the Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez decision
to re-establish dialogue with the current Catalan government has been
emphatically criticised by the right-wing opposition parties
(Ciudadanos, Partido Popular/PP, and Vox) and to a lesser extent within
his own PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español/social-democratic)
party. This is particularly the case following the Spanish government’s
claim it would be willing to include the inclusion of a “rapporteur” who
could coordinate discussions in the ongoing dialogue between political
parties in Catalonia regarding the Catalan question. The current
social-democratic Spanish government, that came into power
after the 2018 vote of no confidence in the government of Mariano Rajoy with the support of various nationalist parties(including
the two major Catalan pro-independence parties), has tried to diffuse
the conflict by offering dialogue. Over the last eight months, the PSOE
administration has experienced significant difficulties when trying to
implement a different strategy in Catalonia due to its narrow
parliamentary majority, that relied on the
support of Podemos and the two main Catalan pro-independence parties(among others),and the radicalised positions on both sides.
Left wing parties in Spain are not comfortable with the country’s
territorial cleavages. That is mainly explained by the deep divisions
within their electorates regarding how to approach decentralisation in
Spain (that is, the transferral of further powers and resources from the
national to the regional level), the allowance of a referendum on
self-determination and, most recently, the type of sentence applicable
to Catalan secessionist leaders. According to a
recent poll,
44% of those voting for the centre-left PSOE consider that offences of
rebellion were committed whereas 47% believe that secessionist leaders
committed a crime but not one as serious as rebellion. Meanwhile, 38% of
PSOE voters would accept for the prosecuted Catalan leaders to be
granted pardons, and regarding Podemos, a party to the left of PSOE, 66%
of their voters support a pardoning of secessionist leaders.
Contrastingly, the electorate of the right-wing parties’ is more
clear-cut, as a majority (87% of PP voters, 73% of Ciudadanos, and 95%
of Vox) believes that an offence of rebellion took place in September
and October 2017 in Catalonia. Furthermore, as a response to the
exceptional situation in Catalonia, the issue of Spanish unity has
regained salience as a basis for political mobilisation fostering the
emergence of an explicit Spanish nationalism, which finds in Vox, a
far-right party, its most extreme form.
The political situation in Spain has again attracted the attention of
the international media amid the high-profile trial of twelve of the
secessionist leaders. Although nationalist parties have claimed that
they should be prosecuted due to their political ideas,
they are actually being accused of a series of actions which are
illegal according to the interpretation of the judges of Catalan and
Spanish legislation. The fact that the current Catalan president, Quim
Torra, an outspoken pro-independence leader, is not on trial and does
not face any legal charges shows that in Spain political leaders are not
prosecuted for expressing ideas or thinking different.
It should be noted that under Spain’s legal system more than one
prosecution is possible. In this case there are three, namely from:
Spain’s public prosecutor (
fiscalía del Estado), the state
solicitors (the legal representatives of the Spanish government) and a
private prosecution led by Vox, Spain’s new far-right party. Both the
public prosecutor and the state solicitors accuse most of the defendants
(nine in total) of misappropriation of public funds to finance the
October 1
streferendum. However, there are substantial
differences between the prosecutions regarding the other charges. First,
Spain’s public prosecutor accuses nine of rebellion, including former
Catalan vice-president Oriol Junqueras. The charges of rebellion would
involve long jail sentences, ranging from 16 to 25 years in prison if
found guilty. Some pundits have expressed their doubts concerning the
appropriateness of the rebellion charge, as this charge requires
violence to have taken place and it seems unlikely that any call for
violence by the defendants can be proven in court. Second, Spain’s
solicitor, representing the Spanish state in the courts, has not accused
secessionist leaders of rebellion; instead, its accusation focuses on
the crimes of sedition and misuse of public funds regarding the
referendum and the unilateral declaration of independence.
Under the article 544 of the Spanish Criminal Code,
sedition consists of “a public and tumultuous uprising” brought about
tin order to “prevent the application of laws, either by force or
outside legal channels.” Third, the far-right party Vox, acting as
private prosecutor, and accuse the defendants of criminal conspiracy, a
charge that it is unlikely to find legal grounds in the trial. After its
success in the December 2018 regional elections in Andalusia, Vox aims
to gain political attention by exploiting the trial for their electoral
benefit. Meanwhile, the trial is being broadcast on television so that
all can judge the neutrality of the process, particularly after the
repeated allegations made by pro-independence leaders regarding the lack
of judicial guarantees and fair trial procedures in the country’s
highest court.
From a political point of view, this trial seems to be acting as a
glue for the deeply divided secessionist parties in Catalonia, and has
increased the cost of a compromise between pro-independence parties and
Spanish unionists. Aside from the clear implications of this dynamic
with respect to regional politics in Catalonia, the conflict also
influences Spain’s political developments at the national level. The
fact that the two main Catalan separatist parties – Esquerra Republicana
de Catalunya/Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC) and Partit Demòcrata
Europeu Català/Catalan European Democratic Party (PdeCAT)– voted against
the 2019 draft budget in the Congress of Deputies on 13 February, which
brought about the end of the parliamentary term in
Spain (a snap poll will be held on April 28), is an example of how much
the Catalan issue matters in every day Spanish politics. Furthermore,
ERC and PDeCAT opposition to the budget also suggests that moderate
leaders within the secessionist movement do not currently enjoy much
power in their respective parties.
In the coming weeks, the Catalan nationalist parties will continue
claiming that the trial is a fraud and will not accept the verdict if
the judgement is unfavourable in their view. In that case, the trial
could end up at the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg.
However, it is misleading to affirm that the trial against the Catalan
independence leaders
is a test of the Spanish judiciary and democracy. As Frans Timmermans, the European Commission Vice president,
has stated,
there is “no reason to doubt” the independence of the judges and the
fairness of the trial. The presence of the far-right Vox party, the
increasing level of polarisation along identity and territorial lines in
Spanish politics and the previous political responsibilities of those
involved brings to the trial an irrefutable political dimension.
However, judicial power remains independent in Spain, the process is
transparent and open to the public, and the judges’ final decision will
be open to appeal. According to the reports of international
organisations such as Freedom House and the
Economist Intelligence UnitSpain
is a full democracy and the separation of powers is guaranteed. There
is no reason to suspect that this trial will be substantially different
from those that may occur in any other liberal democracy in Europe.
The trial, regardless of the sentence that will be imposed, will not
solve the structural divisions within Catalonia. Sociologist
Thomas Jeffrey Mileyhas pointed out that Catalonia “
can be accurately described as a divided society”, in the sense that ethnolinguistic, territorial and class cleavages overlap with each other,
which is reflected in partisanship and preference for independencein
some quarters. Catalan nationalist parties have often overlooked this
reality and have presented the Catalan people as a single and
homogeneous society seeking their independence. For instance, Catalans
with a background outside the region and low incomes are mostly against
independence, whereas wealthier Catalans who have lived in the region
for generations are much more supportive of independence.
In conclusion, a de-escalation of the situation in the following
months is unlikely to take place. First, the electoral competition
between ERC and PDeCAT for the dominance of the pro-independence
movement in Catalonia reduces these parties’ incentive for compromise.
Second, a similar competition is playing out at the national level
between center-right and right-wing parties. After the emergence of the
far-right Vox, Ciudadanos and PP are expected to maintain a hard stance
on this issue, especially with four elections ahead, with national
elections on April 28, and local, regional, national and European
Parliament on May 26. As the trial is taking place in the weeks before
the 28 April general election, Catalonia is going to be one of the main
topics of the campaign. In order to succeed in this electoral
environment, during the campaign the PSOE will present itself as the
party of dialogue and will portray centre-right and right-wing parties
as incapable and unwilling of managing the conflict in Catalonia.
https://policynetwork.org/opinions/blogs/the-catalan-question-the-neverending-story/
